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Abstract
This paper is an exploration of the conceptual issues that have arisen
in the course of investigating speed-up and slowdown phenomena in
small Turing machines. We present the results of a test that may spur
experimental approaches to the notion of computational irreducibility.
The test involves a systematic attempt to outrun the computation of a
large number of small Turing machines (all 3 and 4 state, 2 symbol) by
means of integer sequence prediction using a specialized function finder
program. This massive experiment prompts an investigation into rates of
convergence of decision procedures and the decidability of sets in addition
to a discussion of the (un)predictability of deterministic computing
systems in practice. We think this investigation constitutes a novel
approach to the discussion of an epistemological question in the context
of a computer simulation, and thus represents an interesting exploration
at the boundary between philosophical concerns and computational
experiments.
Keywords: Computational irreducibility; unpredictability; problem
of induction; algorithmic epistemology; halting problem. 2010 Mathe-
matics Subject Classification: 68Q01, 68Q17, 68Q15
1
1 Introduction
For more than half a century mathematicians and computer scientists have
known that final victory is impossible in the struggle to attain ultimate pre-
dictability. Even for deterministic systems we have accepted that there are
truths and facts about these systems which will remain unproven, as shown by
Kurt Go¨del and Alan Turing for formal axiom systems and computing machines.
This doesn’t mean that we have to give up on gaining new insights through the
study of predictability and unpredictability in deterministic systems.
More and more powerful computing machines made possible tasks that has
hitherto seemed impossible, and it wasn’t long after Go¨del and Turing’s work
when people started asking how much time a task would take if performed with
one rather than another algorithm. The need for a notion of complexity became
clear. Although not formally spelled out, in a letter written to von Neumann
(Princeton, March 20, 1956), Go¨del himself had already proposed a first version
of the P=NP? problem in terms of finite problems of quadratic time (the letter
came to light in 1988). Efficiency became a guiding principle in the design of
algorithms, but the idea of designing an algorithm capable of producing optimal
algorithms was found to be equivalent to the halting problem. For if there were
a way to find such an algorithm, Go¨del and Turing’s unsolvable and undecid-
able problems would be solved. Therefore one has no choice but to exchange
idealistic goals for realistic approximations. In this paper we present an exper-
imental approach for dealing with the notion of computational irreducibility as
connected to the problem of empirical unpredictability. We think our approach
is a novel one, in which we bring to a formal framework (a computer experi-
ment) a notion we believe is largely epistemological in nature (computational
irreducibility).
2 Predicting the behavior of deterministic com-
puting systems
Will looking at the behavior of a system for certain times and in certain cases tell
you anything about the behavior of the system at a later time and in the general
case? For example, the phase transition measure presented in [19] implies that
one may, within limits, be able to predict the overall behavior of a system
from a segment of initial inputs based on the prior variability of said system.
Experience tells us we would do well to predict future behavior on the basis of
prior behavior (a Bayesian hypothesis), yet we know this is impossible in the
general case due to the halting problem.
This is also related to Israeli and Goldenfeld’s [8] findings. They showed
that some computationally irreducible Elementary Cellular Automata (ECA)
have properties that are predictable at certain coarse-grained levels. They did
so by employing a renormalization group technique, a mathematical apparatus
that allows one to investigate the changes in a physical system as one views
it at different distance scales. They sought ways to replace several cells of
2
an automaton with a single cell. However, their prediction capabilities too are
bedeviled by the unavoidable (and ultimately undecidable) induction problem of
whether one can keep on predicting for all initial conditions and for any number
of steps, without having to run the system for all possible initial conditions and
for an arbitrary number of steps.
The question is, then, under what circumstances this kind of large-scale
prediction is possible. For ECA Rule 30 in Wolfram’s CA enumeration [18],
for example, this large-scale approach doesn’t seem to say very much. In many
cases, it may at most predict a few steps ahead, meaning that while the behavior
of the system is not completely chaotic, it is unpredictable, in the sense that one
cannot in general predict an arbitrary number of steps ahead without having
to run the entire computation step-by-step. For many systems, including the
most random-looking ones, overall behavior cannot be expected to change much.
One of the main features of systems in Wolfram’s class 4 [17] is precisely the
existence of pervasive structures that one can predict up to a certain point.
What is surprising is that in all these fully deterministic and extremely simple
systems, such as ECA, not every aspect of their evolution is trivially predictable,
not because of a problem of measurement or hypersensitivity, but because we
don’t know whether there are any shortcuts—whether they exist or how to
systematically find them. And some of these questions are reducible to the
halting problem.
Figure 1: In this simulation of ECA Rule 30, each row of pixels is derived
from the one above it. No shortcut is known for computing all bit values of
any column and row without having to run the system, despite the extreme
simplicity of the fully deterministic rule that generates it (icon at the top).
3 Irreducibility measures
There are several forms of irreducibility in computing systems, ranging from
undecidability to intractability to nonlinearity. The principle of computational
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irreducibility as set forth in [18] states that while some computations may admit
shortcuts that allow them to be simulated more rapidly by another system, most
non-trivial systems would require a simulation with roughly the same number
of steps as that of the simulated one. In other words, other than by performing
every step at a faster speed (say with a faster computer) non-trivial computa-
tional processes cannot be simulated faster than they occur. Wolfram doesn’t
seem to take a position on whether this is an ontological or an epistemological
matter. That is, whether there is no such shortcut or whether in the general
case such a shortcut is not known. The authors think that the principle, in the
context originally stated, admits an epistemological interpretation.
Although computational irreducibility and traditional computational com-
plexity are concerned with time, Wolfram’s principle is intrinsic to the computer
system, in that it is independent of any external resource such as the input of
the system. Traditional time complexity is a measure based on the asymptotic
behavior of a system with regard to the length of its inputs. One cannot say,
however, whether a machine with a fixed input belongs to a particular time
complexity class, while Wolfram’s computational irreducibility question does
still apply.
We will therefore not discuss the traditional complexity measures, as we
think they do not capture the notion of computational irreducibility, not be-
ing defined for a computation starting from a given fixed initial configuration.
Other non-constructive measures of complexity and related results, such as
Blum’s speed-up theorem, while related and pertinent, belong to the highly
non-constructive branch of computability theory. For some, existence without
a constructive method may be as meaningful as non-existence. Computability
theorists have, however, managed to present negative results in a positive way
by means of the highly non-constructive frameworks in which they are set forth.
Blum’s speed-up theorem asserts that there exist problems for which finding
the optimal algorithm cannot be achieved. For every algorithm that solves a
problem, there is always another one that is significantly faster. The proof of
the speed-up theorem is given in [2, 15, 9, 16]. Arguments used to defend the
position that this theorem is not relevant for practical computing are known in
the literature [7].
More effective versions of Blum’s theorem concerning occasional speedup
allow an algorithm to compute a function faster for a certain number of argu-
ments, and even an infinite number of them, while possibly computing the rest
of the arguments at a slower pace. If one assumes that Blum’s speedup theorem
is effective for an initial segment of values of a function, this leads to a strange
situation where the faster program is known to be one among a finite set of
programs that are about equally efficient, and which compute functions having
a finite number of incorrect values, thereby introducing a degree of uncertainty
into their prediction capabilities. There seems therefore to be a connection be-
tween prediction certainty and effectiveness: the more constructive, the greater
the unpredictability.
Without diminishing the importance of theoretical approaches such as the
speed-up theorem, we quote the following observation attributed to David
4
Deutsch [4]:
The theory of computation has traditionally been studied almost
entirely in the abstract, as a topic in pure mathematics. This is to
miss the point of it. Computers are physical objects, and computa-
tions are physical processes. What computers can or cannot com-
pute is determined by the laws of physics alone, and not by pure
mathematics.
Sutner [13] also points out that Deutsch:
[M]akes an important point: the kinds of computations that can
be physically realized, at least in the context of some idealized model
of physics, are not well represented by the purely mathematical the-
ory of computation.
Ours is an experimental approach, and a novel test combining both a philo-
sophical discussion and a computer simulation. But we are neither interested in
entering into an ontological discussion about the relationship between physics
and mathematics nor in purely theoretical measures of time complexity. Rather,
we are interested in the consequences of undertaking an experiment, i.e., in the
performance of this basic computer simulation as a way of gaining insight into
the notion of computational irreducibility and as a contribution to the discus-
sion of this epistemic question in a more formal, albeit experimental, context.
Our approach may stimulate further empirical investigation into this kind of
computational irreducibility.
The tests consist of having an algorithm try to foresee a computation, given
a certain computational history. By Levin’s semi-measure [14] m(s), we know
that one can construct a prior distribution based on this computational history,
and that there is no better way (with no other information available) to predict
an output than by using m(s). But m(s) is not computable1. The alternative
option is therefore to apply a battery of known algorithms to a sequence of
outputs to see whether the next output can be predicted. The obvious thing to
do is to try to capture the behavior of various systems and see whether one can
say something about their future evolution. This is the approach we adopt.
4 The experiment
We will often refer to the collection of Turing machines with n states and 2
symbols as a Turing machine space denoted by (n,2). We ran all the one-sided
Turing machines in (2,2) and (3,2) for 1000 steps for the first 21 input values
0, 1, . . . , 20. If a Turing machine did not halt by 1000 steps we say that it
diverged (the computation didn’t reach a value upon halting).
Clearly, at the outset of this project we needed to decide on at least the
following issues:
1Although it is approachable for some cases of limited size, as shown in [5]
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1. How to represent numbers on a Turing machine.
2. How to decide which function is computed by a particular Turing machine.
3. How to decide when a computation is to be considered finished.
We collected all the functions for the 21 inputs and compared the time
complexity classes, the number of outputs and the number of different functions
computed between (2,2) and (3,2), as well as the number of outputs, in order
to determine what function a machine was computing.
4.1 Formalism
In our experiment we have chosen to work with deterministic one-sided single-
tape Turing machines, as we have done before [10] for experiments on trade-offs
between time and program-size complexity. That is to say, we work with Turing
machines with a tape that is unlimited to the left but limited on the right-hand
side. One-step transitions in the classical Turing machine model are defined to
cost one time unit each. One-sided Turing machines are among the common
conventions in the literature, perhaps second only to two-sided Turing machines.
The following considerations led us to work with one-sided Turing machines,
which we found more suitable than other configurations for our experiment.
There are (2sk)
sk
s-state k-symbol one-sided tape Turing machines. That
means 4 096 in (2,2) and 2 985 984 in (3,2). The number of Turing machines
grows exponentially when states are added. For representing the data without
having to store the actual outputs, which were likely to rapidly exceed our
hardware capabilities, we needed to devise a representation scheme that was
efficient with regard to optimizing space (hence non-unary). On a one-sided
tape which is unlimited to the left, but limited on the right, interpreting a tape
content that is almost uniformly zero is straightforward. For example, the tape
. . . 00101 would be interpreted as a binary string read as 5 in base 10. The
interpretation of a digit depends on its position in the number. e.g. in the
decimal number 121, the leftmost 1 corresponds to the hundredths, the 2 to
the tenths, and the rightmost 1 to the units. For a two-sided infinite tape one
can think of many ways to come up with a representation, but all seem rather
arbitrary.
With a one-sided tape there is also no need for an extra halting state. We say
that a computation simply halts whenever the head “drops off” the right hand
side of the tape. That is, when the head is on the cell on the extreme right and
receives the instruction to move right. A two-way unbounded tape would require
an extra halting state, which in light of these considerations is undesirable. By
exploring a whole finite class, one avoids the choice of an enumeration that is
always arbitrary or difficult to justify otherwise. This is because the actual
enumeration in our exhaustive approach is not relevant, thereby ensuring that
we go through each of the machines in the given space once and only once. Of
course this is feasible because every (n,2) space is finite.
On the basis of these considerations, and the fact that work has been done
along the lines of this experiment [18], we decided to fix this Turing machine
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formalism and choose the one-way tape model. We decided to represent the
input in unary. From a theoretical standpoint it is desirable that the empty
tape input be different from the zero input. Thus the final choice for our in-
put representation was to represent the number x by x + 1 consecutive 1s. A
discussion of the choice of input representation is available in [10].
4.2 Definition of computed function and choice of runtime
cutoff
The general question of whether a function is defined by the computation of
a particular Turing machine is undecidable because there is no general finite
procedure to verify that M(x) = M ′(x) for all x. Whether two Turing machines
define the same function is undecidable for the same reason. In accordance with
convention, we say then that a Turing machineM computes a function f ifM(x)
upon halting produces as output the result of evaluating f with the argument
x. One also has to impose some restrictions on the number of steps allowed
and weaken the definition of a function computed by a Turing machine, given
that one cannot finitely test whether a machine computes a function for every
input/argument.
Theory tells us that when we let the machine run further the probability of
halting drops exponentially [3]. There will always be arbitrary choices imposed
by the restrictions of the halting problem. The choice of a 1000 step cutoff,
however, is prompted both by the known values of the busy beaver with 4
states and 2 symbols (that is, 107 steps) and the results in [?], on the basis of
which we decided to let the machines run up to about 10 times the number of
steps traversed by a busy beaver with 4 states and 2 symbols with empty input,
given that we were feeding the machines with other than just empty inputs
(that is, with the 21 different values defining the function). For verification and
convergence investigation, the bound was sometimes taken to a different number
of fixed steps during the experiment (we will point out when this is the case).
Obviously it is to be expected that given a cutoff of 1000 steps, some ma-
chines would halt while others would not. Those not halting may fail to do so
either because they take more than 1000 steps to halt or because they never
halt. We decided, therefore, to complete what we called the non-genuine diverg-
ers with a predictor program as described in 4.3, one that would look at the
values obtained from the machines that did halt and try to predict the values
of the machines that didn’t. We say that a machine diverges if after the cutoff
it hasn’t halted (and therefore has not converged to any value by this number
of steps). We call a machine a non-genuine diverger if it halts in finite time
after the cutoff of 1000 steps. We call it a genuine diverger if it never halts. As
expected, given the halting problem one cannot really know whether a sequence
or a sequence value is a genuine or non-genuine diverger. One can, however,
make an informed guess about whether a computation may halt by looking at
the computational history of the machine for the other function values.
While for theoretical reasons one cannot guarantee that completion of the
sequences with a predictor program will be flawless, error was reduced by com-
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paring the predicted completion with the values obtained by running the ma-
chine for a few more steps (for machines that we suspected to be non-genuine
divergers). We are aware that errors may have occurred in the completion, and
they cannot be eliminated. However, the approximation we arrive at by decid-
ing the halting problem and running all machines upon halting is better than
doing nothing and making comparisons among incomplete sequences.
As explained before, we will consider two Turing machines to have calculated
the same function if (after completion) they compute the same outputs on the
first 21 inputs (0 through 20 in unary, even if divergent in some points), within
the defined runtime bound.
The experiment results comprise sequences of 21 values, one for each of the
21 unary inputs. For 21 inputs this means that 86 016 and 62 705 664 machines
ran up to 1000 steps each for (2,2) and (3,2), for which a program written in C
running on a supercomputer with 24 cpu’s was used, taking about 3 hours each
for a total of 70 cpu hours.
4.3 The predictor program
The function FindSequenceFunction, built into the computer algebra system
Mathematica, takes a sequence of integer values {a1, a2, . . .} to define a function
that yields the sequence an. FindSequenceFunction finds results in terms of
a wide range of integer functions, as well as implicit solutions to difference
equations represented by the expression DifferenceRoot in Mathematica. By
default DifferenceRoot uses early elements in the list to find candidate functions,
then validates the functions by looking at later elements. DifferenceRoot is
generated by functions such as Sum, RSolve and SeriesCoefficient. RSolve can
solve linear recurrence equations of any order with constant coefficients. It
can also solve many linear equations (up to second order) with non-constant
coefficients, as well as many nonlinear equations. Since this is not the place
to define exactly what DifferenceRoot, SeriesCoefficient or RSolve do, one can
think of the predictor based on FindSequenceFunction as a black box computer
specializing in the prediction of integer sequences using advanced symbolic and
numerical tools together with regression analysis. Evidently writing an ultimate
algorithm to make perfect predictions is impossible due to the halting problem,
so one can only rely on limited specialized implementations of these kinds of
predicting programs. For our purposes, FindSequenceFunction can be seen as
a specialized Turing machine for integer sequence prediction.
The predictor program takes the successive output values– in base 10– of a
Turing machine for the sequence of 21 inputs in unary up to the first divergent
(non-halting upon the chosen runtime) value and tries to predict the divergent
output. The same sequence-generating function obtained is used to complete
the sequence if other non-convergent values exist. This is an example of a
completed Turing machine output sequence. Given (3, 6, 9, 12, -1, 18, 21, -1,
27, -1, 33, -1) it is retrieved completed as (3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33,
36). Notice how the divergent values denoted by −1 are replaced with values
completing the sequence with the predictor algorithm based in Mathematica’s
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FindSequenceFunction. To begin with, we were interested in investigating how
many sequences were:
1. Fully completed
2. Partially completed
3. Not completed at all
And of (1) and (2), what percentage (a) had been correctly completed (b)
had been incorrectly completed. The only way to verify (a) is by running the
Turing machine for more steps. An alternative is to look at the rule and try
to figure out its behavior, but that doesn’t always work, and we know it is
impossible to get right because of the halting problem.
We also know that because of the halting problem (a) cannot be determined
with absolute certainty. However, we wanted to quantify the deviation from
certainty and ascertain whether the process managed to partially complete some
divergent values of some sequences. We ran the Turing machines up to 20×103,
and in some cases for more steps, to see whether we had managed to shortcut
the computation.
An objection that may be raised here is that the function design may favor
certain sequences over others. This is certainly the case, and it could be that the
particular set of algorithms is such that they are unable to partially complete a
sequence. The objection would thus not be entirely invalid and would seem to
apply to any prediction procedure devised. Let’s see, however, what we mean by
a partially completed sequence. The predictor function is defined in such a way
that it either finds the sequence-generating function or it does not. If it does,
nothing prevents it from calculating any value, other than perhaps constraints
on the hardware (Mathematica is machine-precision dependent only). If the
function does not find the sequence-generating function, then it won’t calculate
any value, leaving no room for partial completion. To work around this problem,
we also focused on the sequences completed incorrectly. To this end, we ran the
machines for further steps and compared them, then fed the predictor once
again with more values. It may also be that the machines in (3,2) are all
computationally too simple even for non-empty inputs, in which case we would
like to instigate further experiments. However, whether or not they are too
simple, there were eight cases in (3,2) in which the predictor program could not
complete the sequences. These were the cases in which the Turing machines
used the greatest amount of resources, with the greatest runtimes and space
usages, as shown in Table 3. The predictor program, however, allowed us to
identify these cases by failing to complete them.
5 Results
5.1 Decidable sets
Interestingly, we found that only a few values were needed for determining a
sequence and therefore deciding the set of generated sequences; we need not have
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machine space
no. runtime usage
582 281 8 400 889 4116
582 263 1 687 273 2068
599 063 894 481 409 27 304
1 031 019 2 621 435 56
1 233 829 2 103 293 2068
1 241 010 774 333 1524
1 233 815 1 687 273 2068
1 716 199 260 615 886
Table 1: Maximum runtimes and space usage produced by (3,2).
computed all 21 values in both the space (2,2) and the space (3,2), although we
in fact did so because there was no way to know this beforehand.
Tables 2 and 3 show that algorithms (that is, output sequences together with
runtimes and tape space usages) in (2,2) and (3,2) are completely determined
by the first 4 and 11 values out of 21, which means that it suffices to compute
4 and 11 inputs to know what function in (2,2) and (3,2) is being computed.
Likewise, functions (that is output sequences only) are defined by the first 3
and 8 sequence values only.
Sequence type total cases decidable by
first n inputs
functions 74 3
runtimes 49 3
space usages 24 3
all 236 4
Table 2: Decidability of sets in (2,2).
Sequence type total cases decidable by
first n inputs
functions 3886 8
runtimes 3676 10
space usages 763 11
all 8222 11
Table 3: Decidability of sets in (3,2).
5.2 Sequence classification
We used the predictor program to try to predict the non-convergent values
of the sequence of outputs of a Turing machine computing a function for 21
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values, as well as the sequences of runtimes and space usage (the contiguous
cells which the machine head passed over). Before going into the details of the
results, we would like to mention that we found that the sequences could be
classified into six classes (not necessarily mutually exclusive). The following
are typical examples belonging to different classes:
All-convergent: (0, 3, 0, 15, 0, 63, 0, 255, 0, 1023, 0, 4095, 0, 16383, 0, 65535,
0,262143, 0,1048575,0), (1, 6, 12, 25, 51, 103, 207, 415, 831, 1663, 3327, 6655,
13311, 26623, 53247, 106495, 212991, 425983, 851967, 1703935, 3407871).
Divergers from one point on (subset of genuine divergers): (6, 63, 126, -1, -1,
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, - 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1), (1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127,
255, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1).
Convergers alternating with divergers: (-1, 2, -1, 2 , -1 , 2, -1, 2, -1, 2, -1, 2, -1,
2, -1, 2, -1, 2, -1, 2, -1), (-1, 0, 0, 4, -1, 20, -1, 84, -1, 340, -1, 1364, -1, 5460, -1,
21844, -1 ,87380, -1 ,349524, -1).
Non-genuine divergers from one point on, sometimes alternating with genuine
divergers: (-1, 4, 16, 64, 256, 1024, 4096, 16384, 65536, 262144, 1048576,
4194304, 16777216, 67108864, 268435456, 1073741824, 4294967296, -1, -1,
-1, -1), (31, 127, 511, 2047, 8191, 32767, 131071, 524287, 2097151,8388607,
33554431, 134217727, 536870911, 2147483647, 8589934591, 34359738367,
137438953471, 549755813887, 2199023255551, 8796093022207, -1).
Genuine divergers: (-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
-1, -1, -1, -1), (-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0, 64, 192, 448, 960, 1984, 4032, 8128, 16320,
32704, 65472, 131008, 262080, 524224, 1048512, 2097088).
A few cases were hard to specify but definitely belonged to some of the
identified classes, most likely to the class of non-genuine divergers: (0, 1, -1, 3,
-1, -1, 7, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1).
Computation type No. of cases fraction
All-convergent 2500 0.62
Alternating convergent/divergent 383 0.095
Genuine diverger 1276 0.32
Alternating non-genuine diverger/true diverger 236 0.059
Table 4: Summary of detected cases (not necessarily mutually exclusive) of
functions computed by all (3,2) Turing machines.
Among the non-genuine divergers, 0.81% of them converged after 20 × 103
steps, which means we most likely identified all non-genuine divergers. In the
end, among the completed Turing machines only eight didn’t match the second
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prediction (were not completed), and needed to run as many as 109 steps to
halt, with the exact greatest halting times 894 481 409 < 109.
Figure 2: Breakdown of cases after manual inspection of output sequences of
Turing machines with runtime bound of 1000 steps before completion process
(alternating means divergent and convergent values combined).
5.3 Completion process
5.3.1 Selection of sequences to complete
We looked at the maximum runtime of each Turing machine in (3,2) and selected
those functions that had some divergent values, with one runtime greater or
equal to 480 steps. Among the 3368 Turing machines computed in (3,2) after
1000 steps, there were 248 divergent sequences (i.e. Turing machines that did not
halt up to that runtime for at least one of the 21 inputs defining the function) and
at least one convergent value taking at least 480 steps. We chose this runtime
to explore because we found that computations with close to maximal runtimes
(1000 steps) were likely to be trivial (e.g. computations that go straight over
the tape printing the same symbol) and therefore less interesting (and easy) to
complete (something that we verified by sampling a subset of these machines).
Moreover, after further calculation, these computations were found to be true
divergers, because we ran them for 4000 steps with no new values produced.
refer to the process of completing the sequences of function outputs, runtimes
and space usage of a Turing machine over the 21 inputs (as described in 4) as a
prediction. The process of predicting all the sequences (output, runtime, space
usage) of a Turing machine for 21 inputs is obviously more important than
predicting a single one of these sequences (e.g. the output). Predicting the
three sequences of a Turing machine for the 21 values is equivalent to predicting
the exact path for computing an outcome, in other words, the exact algorithm.
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To reduce costs given the number of predictions we had to perform, we ruled
out some symmetrical cases. For each Turing machine in (n,2) there is another
one carrying out exactly the same computation (this is because the generating
rules are symmetrical, and they start over the same initial configuration). We
called these twin Turing machines and reduced the data by half thanks to this
symmetry. So for each pair of twin rules only one rule in each pair was selected.
Hence we considered 1684 sequences. We ran the predictor program based on
the FindSequenceFunction in Mathematica to try to complete the divergences.
That is, to complete output, runtime and space usage for each of the 1684
selected Turing machines.
5.3.2 The prediction vs. the actual outcome
For a prediction to be called successful we require that the output, runtime
and space usage sequences coincide in every value with the actual output of
the step-by-step computation (after verification). One among three outcomes is
possible:
• Both the step-by-step computation and the sequences obtained with the
predictor completion produced the same data, which leads us to conclude
that the prediction was accurate.
• The step-by-step computation produces a non-convergent value −1, mean-
ing that after the time bound the step-by-step computation doesn’t pro-
duce any output that isn’t also produced by the predictor (which means
that either the value to be produced requires a larger time bound, or
that the predictor has failed, predicting a convergent value where there is
actually a divergent one).
• The step-by-step computation produces a value that the predictor algo-
rithm does not predict.
The number of incorrectly predicted Turing machines was only 45 (if twin
rules are considered, this number is 90), provided we don’t tag as incorrect the
sequences that couldn’t be completed with the predictor algorithm but were
actually convergent. Hence, of a total of 3368 sequences completed with the
predictor, only 90 were incorrect. One can say then that for the predictor most
of the sequences were easily predictable.
In addition to these 45 cases of incorrect completions, we found 108 cases
where the step-by-step computation produced new sequence values that the
predictor did not predict, that is, 153 cases where differences were observed
in at least one of the sequences that define an algorithm (outputs, runtimes
and space usage) when the predictor program was compared to the step-by-step
computation.
5.3.3 A second attempt at prediction
This time the step-by-step computation ran for 20 × 105 steps. The predictor
algorithm was improved upon by simply looking at the final values rather than
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considering the whole sequence history since the beginning. Now we consider a
prediction successful only if for each of the 21-values:
• Both the sequences obtained with the predictor algorithm and the step-
by-step computation converge, with the same output, runtime and space
sequences.
• Neither the sequences obtained with the predictor algorithm nor those
obtained through step-by-step computation converge.
• The step-by-step computation diverges but the sequences obtained with
the predictor have completed everything with runtime > 20× 105
There were only eight cases of failures and non-completed sequences (not
counting twin rules). That is, 0.47% of the Turing machines couldn’t be com-
pleted, which is to say that no shortcut was found for them. These Turing
machines that could not be completed were characterized by the greatest usage
of space and time and the largest outputs, and they behaved like Busy Beaver
machines [11] in the space we were looking at. Table 4 summarizes our find-
ings on the completion process of the computed sequences in (3,2). These eight
sequences were finally completed by running the Turing machine for up to 109
steps.
Only eight cases couldn’t be completed after the last test, and none
were incorrectly completed sequences. For example, the predictor couldn’t
find the generating function for the output sequence: 21, 43, 1367, 2735,
1398111, 2796223, 366503875967, 733007751935, 6296488643826193618431,
12592977287652387236863, 464598858302721315448660797346840864708607 . . .
and therefore couldn’t complete the sequence. The obvious reason for this is the
rate of growth of the sequence. All eight cases were computations with super
fast growing values.
5.4 Larger experiment with (4,2)
A sample of 56× 106 (4,2) Turing machines was randomly chosen, keeping only
those with an initial segment converging up to 1000 steps, equal to one of the
284 functions computed in (2,2) and (3,2) (following a comparison experiment
concerning time complexity among different Turing machine spaces undertaken
in [10]). The final number of sampled machines was 4 203 131. Of these, 30 955
that had divergent values which were suspected to be actually convergent were
selected to be completed by the predictor program. Once completed by the
predictor program, they were checked against the step-by-step computation up
to 20× 105 steps.
Of the 30 955, only 69 Turing machines were found not to have been com-
pleted by the predictor program, of which 40 turned out to be incorrectly com-
pleted. Some of them were failures that could easily have been predicted by a
visual inspection, but had an initial value that cheated the predictor program.
These were therefore cataloged as silly failings of the predictor program due to
its particular limitations rather than the result of a truly complicated sequence.
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Nevertheless, among the failures, the predictor program incorrectly completed
a few sequences in a way that looked reasonable but that turned out not to
be the actual computation of the Turing machine being predicted, and these
were the cases we were most interested in. The following runtime sequence was
completed by letting the actual Turing machine run for 20 × 105 steps: 5, 7,
19, 27, 59, 87, 179, 267, 539, 807, 1619, 2427, 4859, 7287, 14579, 21867, 43739,
65607, 131219, 196827, . . . , but was completed by the predictor program as
follows: 5, 7, 19, 27, 59, 87, 179, 267, 539, 807, 1619, 2427, 4859, 7287, 14579,
21867, 45925, 65607, . . . , with 45925 rather than 43739, representing one of the
very few cases in which the predictor program actually produced an incorrect
prediction.
To sum up, 69 failures among 30 955 Turing machines represents a .78 suc-
cess rate of the predictor program in a first round, and only a very small fraction
remained after a second pass, eventually leading to a full prediction and there-
fore confirming what we witnessed in smaller spaces such as (3,2). This is in
accordance with what we think is our discovery, which is that there were not
many actual wrong predictions and that either sequences were too hard to pre-
dict (no value was predicted) or they were too easy (and therefore correctly
completed).
5.5 Output encoding discussion
Among the drawbacks of the output convention is that many functions will dis-
play (at least) exponential growth. For example, the tape-identity, i.e. a Turing
machine that outputs the same tape configuration as the input tape configura-
tion, will define the function 2n+1 − 1. In particular, the Turing machine that
halts immediately by running off the tape while leaving the first cell black (with
a 1) also computes the function 2n+1 − 1. This is slightly undesirable, but as
we shall see, in our current set-up there will be few occasions where we actually
wish to interpret the output as a number.
For an output representation it does not suffice to use only encodings and
decodings that always halt (any reasonable encoding or decoding should always
halt, anyway), because this restriction not only ensures that the encoding and
decoding cannot be performing all the computations of the system we are at-
tempting to outrun, but also that the representation is not erasing or adding
complexity to the computation in the representation chosen. One may say then
that the representation must be easily computable, which may be the case with
a change of base. However, we were at a loss to find a single easy way to
represent the output of a Turing machine, since even for the simplest format
compatible with the sequence predictor, the encoding turned out to hide some
of the structure of the computations of certain machines, thus impeding the
predictor and keeping it from truncating the computation –even in these simple
(in the original unary or binary sense) cases.
We found it interesting and worth reporting that the encoding process, in
which the output is interpreted in binary and converted into a decimal number,
actually managed in several cases to inject an apparent complexity into the
15
evolution of the original computation, making the predictor function miss the
sequence generator (the mathematical formula generating the sequence) and
therefore outrun the computation.
Figure 3: A computation of a 3-state 2-symbol Turing machine that seems easy
to predict when looking at it in its original binary representation. Each row n
is the n output of the n = 0, . . . , 20 inputs.
As an illustration, the computation in Figure 3 can easily be
outrun just by looking at it. Each new input produces an alter-
nation of 1 and 0, yet the sequence of outputs converted to dec-
imals looks more complicated due to the encoding process: s =
1, 2, 5, 10, 21, 42, 85, 170, 341, 682, 1365, 2730, 10 922, 21 845, 43 690, 87 381, 174 762,
349 525, 699 050, 1 398 101, 2 796 202. While in binary mod2(0 + n) produces
the sequence, the generating function found by the predictor program for
the sequence of decimal numbers is 1/6(−3 − (−1)n + 22+n). A simpler
representation is possible in the form of a recursive piecewise function:
f(ni) =


1 : ni = 1
2(ni−1) + 1 : ni even
2ni−1 : ni odd
Notice that the recursive function f itself requires the calculation of the
previous ni−1 values in order to calculate the ni value. By definition, recur-
sive functions are irreducible, but they may allow shortcuts–like the formula
1/6(−3 − (−1)n + 22+n) found when the predictor outran the recursive func-
tion f– because they permit the calculation of the i element of the sequence s
without requiring that anything else be calculated. The recursive function, in
this case, is not a shortcut to s, as it retrieves the i value of s without having
to run the actual Turing machine producing ni. But because of the simplicity
of the sequence, the computation of ni requires about n steps, and the recur-
sive function f requires n calculations. On the contrary, both mod2(0 + n) and
1/6(−3− (−1)n + 22+n) are actual shortcuts of s, even though the latter may
hide the simplicity of the sequence in binary, whereas in the case of the recur-
sive function the simplicity is somehow preserved despite its transformation into
decimals.
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The sequence of decimals is a sort of compiler between the output language
of the Turing machine (base 2) and the language of the predictor program (base
10). Given the way the predictor program works, based on the Mathematica
function FindSequenceFunction, it can only take as input a sequence of integers
constituting an argument.
One may inject or hide apparent complexity when transforming one numer-
ical representation into another. For the out-runner to see patterns it should
be capable of reading the output in the language of the original system (in this
case binary) without translating it. It is not clear whether exploring patterns
in other bases would tell us anything about patterns in the original sequence.
We think that in light of such interesting findings, these questions merit
further discussion. For example, we found other artificial phenomena such as
phase transitions in the distribution of halting times [10], due more to these
conventions than to actual properties of the systems studied.
6 Concluding remarks
An exhaustive experiment was performed to find possible shortcuts to outrun the
computations of all 3-state and a sample of 4-state 2-symbol Turing machines by
means of predicting the values of the sequences of the machine outputs for a se-
quence of the same number of inputs. Even though this is ultimately an ill-fated
approach thanks to the halting problem, the actual ratio of correct predictions
and the rate at which the predictions were achieved was worth studying and
reporting in connection with the concept of computational irreducibility. We
found that despite the fact that sequences were sometimes left incomplete in our
attempt to outrun the computation of Turing machines, no sequence was ever
partially completed. The process of completing sequences of outputs, runtimes
and space usage of Turing machines also gave us an opportunity to discuss in-
teresting aspects of the theory of computation in connection to empirical rather
than merely theoretical computation, including rates of convergence, the con-
cept of decidable sets and the problem of extensionality, as they relate to the
concepts of irreducibility, inductive inference and unpredictability in determin-
istic systems. We hope this approach will stimulate further discussion and more
experiments of both an algorithmic and an epistemological nature.
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